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Introduction
Cooperation in transboundary pollution has proven, and still proves, difficult. Despite the fact that cooperation among nations could raise global welfare because of multilateral negative externalities, and could benefit all nations if accompanied by fair sharing arrangements, strong free-rider incentives prevail. Curbing greenhouse gases illustrates the problems of cooperation vividly. International response to global warming is often traced back to 1988 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded -an international body initiated by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that gathers and summarizes current world-wide scientific evidence on climate change. However, it was not until 1997 when 38 countries agreed to emission ceilings under the Kyoto Protocol to be met in the "commitment period" 2008-2012.
Again, it was not before 2002 when this treaty was ratified. This did not happen before several concessions had been granted to various participants and after the USA had declared to withdraw from the treaty.
Currently, in the light of the Stern report (Stern 2006 ) and the most recent IPCC report (IPCC 2007 ), a follow-up "Post-Kyoto" agreement is being negotiated that should set emission ceilings for the period after 2012. The challenge is to agree on substantial medium and long term emissions reduction targets for industrialized countries, and to encourage participation of the new emerging polluters China, India and Brazil.
Parallel to this political development, the interest in economics to analyze the reasons and possible remedies for the problem of international environmental cooperation emerged. One strand of literature focused on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements (IEAs) which can be traced back to Barrett (1994) , Chander and Tulkens (1992) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992) . Later papers focused on various designs and measures that could mitigate the free-rider problem. Due to the many papers, we refer the reader to the surveys by Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003 Finus ( , 2008 . Other contributions departed from the assumption of a static payoff structure of the initial papers and captured the dynamic nature of the stock pollutants "greenhouse gases". This is also the starting point of the second strand of literature that modeled optimal policy responses in integrated assessment models that capture the dynamic interaction between the economy and the environment and which was pioneered by Nordhaus (1994) . This initiated many other papers which are surveyed for instance in Böhringer and Löschel (2006) . Naturally, there have also been attempts to combine both strands as for instance in Bahn et al. (2009) , Bosello et al. (2003) , Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) , Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Weikard et al. (2006) . On the one hand, this adds more realism to the analysis;
on the other hand, this is sometimes the only way to derive results in richer game theoretic frameworks where analytical solutions are impossible to obtain. This paper is in the tradition of a combined approach: it links a game theoretic module of coalition formation to an integrated assessment numerical simulation module. The later module is based on the CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (CWSM) as for instance used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) and Eyckmans and Finus (2006) , though we use the updated version 1.2.
Different from these papers, but also different from many theoretical contributions on the formation and stability of IEAs, our game theoretic module does not model coalition formation as a simultaneous but as a sequential decision process. This is motivated by the observation that usually some countries take the initiative of forming IEAs. Others join later or decide not to follow suit. The evolvement of membership in international agreements is a typical feature of many IEAs and is reported for instance in Finus (2003) for many environmental treaties.
The sequential nature of the formation of international climate agreements introduces some new and interesting strategic aspects, but also poses many conceptual problems. This papers is a first step to address these problems, hoping to initiate more work in this important area of research.
We view coalition formation as a two-stage game. In the first stage players decide upon membership and in the second stage they decide upon their economic strategies, which are abatement strategies and in our simulation model also investment in capital and labor. The game is solved backward: equilibrium economic strategies determine the payoff of players and are the basis to decide upon membership. The second stage strategies are derived from a difference game among heterogeneous players, capturing the stock pollutant nature of greenhouse gases. For the membership decision in the first stage we consider a sequential process, though decisions are based on discounted payoffs. Thus, once coalitions have formed, membership is fixed. This contrasts to flexible membership considered in Breton et al. (2008 ), De Zeeuw (2007 , Rubio and Ulph (2007) and Ulph (2004) , invoking the concept of internal and external stability. However, all these papers assume symmetric players and allow only for a single coalition to be formed, probably for analytical tractability. Moreover, a simultaneous coalition formation process at each time t is assumed. This comparison already suggests an avenue for future research, namely the integration of both approaches in order to comprehensively capture the dynamic nature of the formation of agreements and the economic and environmental impacts of climate change.
In the following, we provide an overview of the model in section 2. Then we discuss stage 1 and 2 of coalition formation in reverse order (according to backward induction) in sections 3 and 4.
The focus is on the novel aspect of this paper: the sequential membership process related to the first stage (section 4) with its strategic implications as well as the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game. This will be illustrated with two simple examples as a preparation for the more involved numerical simulations with our climate model CWSM which we present in section 5. Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes. For the first stage, which consists of many sub-stages due to the sequential coalition formation process, we solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium in membership strategies. That is, each player, either in the role of an initiator or in the role of a player who is asked for acceptance should choose her best reply at each point in time for the rest of the game, given the strategies of the other players.
Overview of the Model

1
A non-trivial coalition is a coalition with at least two members.
For the second stage, we follow the standard assumption in the literature on coalition formation and solve for the coalitional Nash equilibrium in economic strategies.
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That is, members of coalition c  in coalition structure c choose their economic strategies such as to maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition, taking the strategies of outsiders as given. In CWSM this payoff is the net present value of a payoff stream, accounting for the fact that climate change is a stock pollution problem.
We now discuss the stages in more detail in reverse order, following the argument of backward induction.
Second Stage of Coalition Formation
Data and Computations
The CWSM is an integrated assessment (IA in the sequel), economy-climate model capturing the endogenous feedback of climate change damages on production and consumption. As the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) , and in subsequent IA models like Bosello et al. (2003) , Böhringer et al. (2007) , Bahn et al. (2009) or Anthoff et al. (2009) , CWSM is a dynamic, long-term, perfect foresight, Ramsey-type optimal growth model with a global climate externality.
The version of the CWS model used in this paper is an updated version of the model used in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) . The new version of the CWS model uses the more sophisticated carbon cycle model of RICE99 described in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) . In addition to a better representation of the climate system, the economic database and parameters of the CWS model have been updated and the reference year is now 2000 instead of 1990. Since an extensive exposition of the model, including the procedure of computing valuations, is provided in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) and 
.,v ( c )) .
Strategically, this means that members who belong to the same coalition behave cooperatively towards their fellow members (otherwise cooperation would not be worthwhile analyzing), but non-cooperatively towards outsiders. Economically, this means strategies are efficient within coalition c  but not globally efficient as long as the grand coalition does not form. It also means that the equilibrium economic strategy vector * s ( c ) corresponds to the classical "social or global optimum" if c is the coalition structure with the grand coalition, and corresponds to the classical "Nash equilibrium" if c is the coalition structure with only singletons.
Valuations with transfers are defined as  
) in a lump-sum fashion (expressed in discounted consumption at time  t 0) and hence does not affect equilibrium economic strategies in the CWSM as shown in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) . This implies a TU-framework and the transfer scheme proposed by these authors leads to valuations (term in square brackets on the R.H.S. in (2)). Shares are those proposed by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) and reflect the relation between individual and global discounted marginal climate change damages in coalition structure c . Hence, the second term favors regions with relatively high marginal damages since they are entitled to a larger share of the surplus of their coalition. The last two columns display aggregate valuations at the World level in absolute and relative terms. The relative magnitudes can be interpreted as a "closing the gap index" (abbreviated CGX), measuring how close a coalition structure comes to the global optimum where the performance in the grand coalition (full cooperation) is 100 percent and the performance in the coalition structure with only singletons (no cooperation) is 0 percent by definition (see the legend of Table 1 ).
Properties of Valuations
Table 1 about here
Apart from stressing that both full and partial cooperation make a difference compared to no cooperation, Table 1 illustrates that not only the size of a coalition matters for the global success of cooperation, but also the identity of its members. Put differently, the commonly held view that a high participation automatically indicates the success of an IEA may be wrong. As a general tendency, the importance of particular regions for global welfare decreases along the following sequence: ROW, CHN, USA, EU, FSU and JPN. ROW´s and CHN´s important role stems from the fact that they can provide cheap abatement. Similarly, JPN´s lesser importance is due to her steep marginal abatement cost curve. However, there is also an additional dimension related to environmental damages. Because optimal economic strategies are derived from coalitions maximizing the joint welfare of its members, the higher the marginal damages of coalition members are, the higher joint abatement efforts will be, everything else being equal.
This has not only a positive spillover effect on fellow coalition members but also on outsiders.
This explains the importance of EU for cooperation.
First Stage of Coalition Formation
Original Game
Based on valuations, either on valuations with or without transfers, V(C) or T V (C), derived in the second stage of coalition formation, players decide upon participation in coalitions in a sequential process. The process is modeled based on the sequential move unanimity game (SMUG) of Bloch (1995) , though for our purposes some changes are necessary which we discuss below. This game is in the spirit of Rubinstein´s (1982) For simplification, Bloch (1995 Bloch ( , 1996 assumes no discounting of valuations during this process.
He also assumes that players who cannot agree on a coalition receive a payoff which is Paretodominated by payoffs in every coalition structure. Thus, the solution to the game becomes "finite". Moreover, he only considers stationary perfect equilibrium strategies in order to reduce the amount of possible equilibria. That is, strategies only depend on the current state (and not on the entire history of the game) in the negotiation process. A sequence of proposals is a perfect equilibrium if proposals and reactions to proposals are mutually best replies for each possible state in the remaining game.
To the best of our knowledge, until now, Bloch´s game has only be applied to economic problems with the assumption that all players have the same payoff function. 4 For ex-ante symmetric players, as this assumption has been termed in the literature, Bloch (1996) has shown that things simplify substantially since the identity of players does not matter and -in most economic examples of interest -payoffs to a player only depend on the sizes of his own and the remaining coalitions in a given coalition structure c . 5 Hence, the sequence in which players make proposals and counter-proposals, as well as the sequence according to which players are asked for acceptance does not matter for the outcome of coalition formation. Moreover, a proposal means to announce the size of a coalition to which the proposer wants to belong and hence the entire 4 See Bloch (2003) for an overview. Bloch's game has been applied for instance by Finus and Rundshagen (2006a) and Ray and Vohra (2001) in the context of the provision of public goods; both applications assuming symmetric players.
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For instance, in a global emission abatement game with a static payoff function Finus and Rundshagen (2003) have shown that, in a given coalition structure, members of larger coalitions receive a lower valuation than members of smaller coalitions because all players receive the same benefits from global abatement but members of larger coalitions choose higher individual abatement levels and therefore have higher abatement costs.
game reduces to a "size announcement game" in which the interests of the proposer and the members of the proposed coalition always coincide.
Modified Game
As pointed out already, we consider heterogeneous players and therefore the sequence of proposals matters. Hence, we have to solve for the equilibrium coalition structure for every possible index sequence of which there are 720 in the case of six players. Section 5 will focus on the effect of different sequences on the outcome of coalition formation. Important questions will be for instance: which regions should be among the initiators in order to induce successful cooperation from a global point of view? Is it an advantage to be an initiator or is a wait-and-seestrategy more promising for individual regions?
Generally, the bargaining game may have no solution. Suppose players have completely contrary preferences about their most preferred outcome. Then if all players insist on their most preferred outcome, this may lead to an infinite number of proposals, rejections and counterproposals. As mentioned, Bloch avoids infinite cycles by assuming that if players do not agree in finite time, they will end up with a Pareto-inferior outcome compared to the valuations of all possible coalition structures. Though this may seem an elegant solution in a theoretical setting, we think it is less appropriate in our context. Viewing the coalition structure with only singletons as the starting point of negotiations, there seems to be no plausible reason why regions should not receive at least this payoff if negotiations fail. Therefore, we follow a pragmatic approach that is inspired by software programs used for chess computers. At the time of an ongoing proposal and as long as no additional coalition has formed, the same player cannot make a second proposal if his/her first proposal has been turned down. It is important to note that this rule only applies if the game does not proceed. If a coalition has eventually formed at stage t , this player can again make a proposal at  t 1 (provided he/she has not accepted already another proposal).
We call Bloch's slightly modified coalition game SMUG Finite Sequential Move Unanimity Game (FSMUG). We order players, i.e. regions in CWSM, randomly and then generate all permutations.
Since like in Bloch (1995) , the relevant history at time t depends only on the current state of the game at time t (and not on the entire history of the game, equilibrium coalition structures are derived as stationary perfect equilibrium. A backtracking algorithm along the lines for instance described in Alho et al. (1987) was programmed in Java, version 1.4.2 in order to determine these equilibria in the FSMUG for the valuations computed with the numerical CWS model.
Properties and Strategies
We first briefly and informally show that our FSMUG -applied to our valuations V( C ) and T V (C ) derived from CWSM -possesses some essential properties which are important for determining equilibrium coalition structures. Then, we illustrate some interesting implications for the optimal strategies of players. For this we use simple examples with three players as the driving forces would be difficult to trace in our application with six players.
First note that an equilibrium in the FSMUG always exists and the equilibrium coalition structure is unique for a given index sequence. This follows from three items: a) the game tree is finite by construction, b) there is perfect information with respect to the history of the game and hence every information set consists of only one decision node and c) at every decision node every player has a strict preference order over all coalition structures for the valuations generated by CWSM.
Second note that all equilibria (e.g. emerging from different index sequences or different sets of valuations) will be individually rational, meaning that every player receives a payoff in excess of the payoff in the coalition structure with only singletons. Regardless of the coalition which has formed in the game, a player i can always remain a singleton by proposing coalition { i }. This strategy ensures him at least the payoff in the singleton coalition structures because the CWSM valuation functions satisfy the so-called positive externality property. This property says that outsiders to a coalition cannot lose from the merger of other players and/or coalitions (e.g. Bloch (2003) , Yi (2003) and Finus and Rundshagen 2006b ). Table 2 shall illustrate the interesting phenomenon that a player may intentionally put forward a proposal that she knows will be turned down. First note that players 2 and 3 derive their highest valuation when the other two players form a coalition and they free-ride. Hence, if either player 2 or 3 is the initiator, they propose a single coalition. Since the singleton coalition Example 1 also illustrates that the equilibrium outcome depends on the sequence of players.
Example 1 in
Moreover, moving first can be associated with an advantage. Regardless who kicks off the game, he/she can implement his/her most preferred coalition structure. That this is not always true will be illustrated in example 2 below.
In example 2 there are only two Pareto-undominated coalition structures, namely If either player 2 or 3 moves first, he/she anticipates that he/she cannot enforce his/her most preferred coalition structure 5 c as player 1 will raise objections. Hence, both players try to enforce their second-best option which is 2 c and which they know will be accepted by player 1, as it is her first-best option. Hence, if player 2 is the initiator, he will propose { 1,2 } , which player 1 will accept, leaving player 3 as a singleton. If player 3 is the initiator, she proposes { 3 } and player 1 and 2 form { 1,2 } .
Thus, if either player 2 or 3 is the initiator, they cannot implement their first choice as an equilibrium (as this is the case if player 1 is the initiator). Even more important, they make proposals which lead to the most preferred coalition structure of player 1. In other words, from player 1's point of view, there is an advantage not to move first.
Results
Base Case
In this section we display and discuss equilibrium coalition structures based on the valuations in CWSM. Table 2 
Table 2 about here
We would like to point out four general observations. First, equilibrium coalition structures emerge that are not a PO among the set of possible coalition structures. This possibility was illustrated in example 2 in section 4.4 and is due to the strategic characteristics of a sequential coalition formation process. As in example 2, this even occurs if Pareto-dominance is only checked among the set of equilibrium coalition structures.
Second, nearly all equilibrium coalition structures include multiple non-trivial coalitions. Hence, if players have a wider choice of options than only joining an agreement or remaining a singleton, coalition structures with multiple coalitions emerge in equilibrium. This observation is in line with simulation results for instance in Finus et al. (2009) and Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and the theoretical findings in Carraro (2000) and Finus and Rundshagen (2003) , though they assume a simultaneous coalition formation process under various membership rules. The relative high average CGX is due to the fact that the FSMUG de facto implies that a coalition only forms if and only if all players unanimously agree to form exactly this coalition. That is, a high degree of unanimity is conducive to the success of coalition formation as spelled out for instance in Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Finus and Rundshagen (2006b) . However, the grand coalition is not stable.
Third, transfers lead to a higher average CGX than no transfers. Transfers seem to align interests more among heterogeneous players for our data set, as they lead to a more symmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation (at least all coalition structures are individually rational), which leads to one equilibrium coalition structure in 98 percent of the possible index sequences. This is different for no transfers where the index sequence matters much more.
Nevertheless, also here the first three ranked equilibrium coalition structures (which are Pareto- Fourth, irrespective whether we consider no transfers or transfers, there is no equilibrium coalition structure which is the most preferred for a particular region among the entire set of coalition structures. 6 In other words, no region, regardless of the sequence in which they make proposals, can enforce its most preferred coalition structure. A similar conclusion, though less pronounced emerges from Table 3 . Table 3 looks at the most preferred and least preferred equilibrium from a region's point of view among the set of equilibrium coalition structures. Percentages indicate the frequency that region i is among the first three in the index sequence when this equilibrium emerges. For instance, USA's most preferred equilibrium for no transfers is the first equilibrium coalition structure displayed in Table 2 . It occurs 32 times. In 30 instances, the USA is among the first three players and hence 30/32=93.8%. Thus, the USA has a first mover advantage when it comes to her most preferred equilibrium. Similarly, USA's worst equilibrium is ranked no. 10 at the world scale (see Table 2 , no transfers). It occurs 78 times and in 12 instances the USA is among the first three players and hence 12/78=15.4%. Put differently, in 84.6% of the cases the USA cannot avoid the worst outcome because of her late mover position. This relation can be interpreted as a first mover advantage to avoid bad outcomes.
The other entries for other regions in Table 3 are computed in the same way. Hence, in row "Best Equilibrium", a percentage above 50% indicates a first mover advantage (indicated bold) and in row "Worst Equilibrium" this is true for a percentage below 50% (indicated bold). Thus, only in the case of transfers there seems to be on average a first mover advantage. This is in line with our example 2 in section 4.4 which showed that it is not always in the interest of a player to move first, i.e. there may be a last or later mover advantage. It appears that -on average -there is a first-mover advantage to avoid the worst outcome.
In the context of the provision of a public good, two incentives can roughly be identified to explain this, though incentives are far more complex for the valuations derived from CWSM. On the one hand, moving first provides the possibility to free-ride by either proposing to remain a singleton or being only a member of a small coalition. This, however, requires that the player can expect that others cooperate if he commits to little cooperation. On the other hand, it can also be advantageous to move later in the game, hoping that others commit to cooperation. In a simple symmetric player context and public good provision Finus and Rundshagen (2006a) have shown that only the first incentive is at work.
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Now, in the case of heterogeneous players, obviously, also the second incentive seems to be relevant in some instances.
Sensitivity Analysis
Since our results have been obtained by simulations, we test the robustness of our conclusions.
As appears from the discussion in the previous sections, we are not interested in quantitative results, but in qualitative conclusions. This seems suggestive given the large uncertainty surrounding the calibration of the parameters of integrated assessment models. Among the main parameters that enter CWSM, we focus on a variation of the discount rate as there has been much debate about the appropriate choice of the discount rate (time preference rate). , for which we produce tables in the spirit of Tables 2 and 3 and which are available upon request.
From this sensitivity analysis the following conclusions can be drawn.
Despite the fact that the composition of some equilibrium coalition structures is different, all conclusions turn out to be very robust. Average success rates measured as average CGX remain very similar. The general observations mentioned in section 5.1 also remain true. Equilibrium coalition structures emerge that are not Pareto-optimal among the entire set of coalition structures and some are even Pareto-dominated by other equilibrium coalition structures, and this happens more frequently in the absence of transfers.
Nearly all equilibrium coalition structures comprise multiple non-trivial coalitions and transfers usually lead to a higher average CGX. Regions can never push through their most preferred coalition structure regardless of the sequence in the negotiations, though there is now one exception: FSU. However, interestingly, when this most preferred coalition structure emerges, the percentage of instances in which FSU is among the first three regions in the index sequence is 7
In example 1 in section 4.4, this free-rider incentive could also be observed if either player 2 or 3 moves first, though the game is not symmetric.
below 50%, suggesting that there is no first but a later mover advantage for FSU. Also for other players there is no indication of first-mover advantage on average concerning their most preferred outcome, suggesting that a wait-and-see-strategy can be attractive to the participants in climate negotiations.
Summary and Conclusions
We combined two modules, an empirical model on climate change and a game theoretic model of coalition formation, to study self-enforcing climate agreements. We considered a new conceptual issue of coalition formation in the context of IEAs: a sequential coalition formation process. This was motivated by the empirical evidence that participation in
IEAs has evolved sequentially in the past. We argued that the sequential move unanimity game proposed by Bloch (1995) has to be modified for practical purposes in order to avoid infinite cyclical proposals. We introduced the assumption that a player whose proposal has been turned down, cannot make a second proposal as long as the formation process has not proceeded. This allowed us to develop a backtracking algorithm to solve for equilibrium coalition structures.
One part of our results illustrated the strategic properties of a sequential coalition formation process. For instance, we showed that there is not always a first-mover advantage, but a wait-andsee-strategy may well pay. Negotiators may even have an incentive to put forward a proposal which they know will be turned down in order to benefit from a later mover advantage. Due to strategic considerations and strong free-rider incentives, equilibrium coalition structures may not be Pareto-optimal. It also clearly emerged that it is very unlikely that single negotiators can push through their most preferred outcome, irrespective of the sequence when they move.
Another part of the results confirmed conclusions derived from a simultaneous coalition formation process. Due to large asymmetries across the world in the climate change context in terms of the environmental damages and abatement cost, compensation payments are conducive to establish effective cooperation. Moreover, if participation is not restricted exogenously to a single agreement, multiple coalitions will emerge as equilibrium outcomes. As argued for instance in Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Finus et al. (2009) , this may be taken as indication to revise previous policy strategies. As long as free-rider incentives do not allow forming a climate agreement with full participation, it may be worthwhile to allow for bilateral agreements instead of focusing on a single treaty.
From our results important avenues for future research emerge. In particular, we believe that more conceptual work is needed to comprehensively capture the dynamic nature of the formation of IEAs in terms of the sequence of proposals, participation, policy goals, enforcement and the stock pollutant nature of greenhouse gases. This is certainly a non-trivial challenge but would help to base policy recommendations for the design of successful future IEAs on a more realistic basis. After all, it is not to be expected that problems like climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer or biodiversity will disappear in the future. In order to save space, the equations shown in Figure A .1 are simplified to an annual representation of the stock variables' accumulation processes. Using a time step different than one year, alters slightly the look of these equations but does not affect the essential aspects of the processes. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) . 42.9 0 * Numbers are percentages of region i having an index number equal or smaller than 3 with respect to the the best and worst equilibrium coalition structure from player i's perspective in Table 2 . Bold entries: %>50 for Best Equilibrium and %<50 for Worst Equilibrium indicate first-mover advantage.
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